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related to the size of the premium for overtime.  Using quarterly data for the period 
1966:3 – 2001:3 we estimate a new employment equation for Australia incorporating 
standard hours of work.  We find empirical support for our approach and we provide 
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We also find a marked asymmetry in the response of employment to variations in real 
GDP and real wages in recession periods as against non-recession periods. 
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An Employment Equation for Australia:  1966-2001 
 
I  Introduction 
 
This paper argues that it is important in explaining employment to allow for changes 
in ‘standard hours of work’. Recent research into the employment equation in 
Australia has ignored standard hours entirely (Russell & Tease (1991), Phipps & 
Sheen (1995) and Lewis & MacDonald, 2002)). Some studies have incorporated 
hours of work into their employment equation but have imposed a long-run elasticity 
of minus one on the coefficient relating employment to hours (Commonwealth 
Treasury (1996), Stacy & Downes (1995), Downes and Bernie (1999)). We argue that 
the relationship is likely to be such that the long run coefficient (elasticity) of the 
number employed with respect to (standard) hours will be neither zero or minus one, 
but instead will likely be positive and less than one. We model the relationship 
between hours and employment and then undertake empirical work to estimate a new 
employment equation for Australia incorporating standard hours of work. 
 
We begin with a brief summary of the findings of recent research. Section III explains 
how we approach the relationship between hours and number of persons employed 
and sets out the testable hypotheses which result from our approach. In section IV we 
estimate an employment equation with the number of non-farm wage and salary 
earners as the dependent variable and compare our results with those obtained by 
other researchers. We argue that other researchers whose sample period includes the 
70s and early 80s (the period when standard hours were falling markedly) have likely 
overstated the size of the elasticity of employment with respect to real wages when 
output is held constant. 
 
II  Employment Equations for Australia 
 
It is possible to model labour services or aggregate hours worked (as in Debelle & 
Vickery, 1998), however, given the importance of modeling unemployment it is 
natural to seek a labour demand or employment equation which can be directly 
expressed in terms of number of persons employed rather than number of aggregate 
hours worked. Also, as Dungey & Pitchford (1998, p 220 – appealing to Hamermesh,   4
1993) have noted: “naïve labour demand equations of this type have some merit as a 
benchmark for more sophisticated analysis”.  
 
The most recent published paper with an employment equation
1 for Australia is that 
by Lewis & MacDonald published in this journal in 2002. Prior to that there were 
papers by Russell & Tease (1991), Phipps & Sheen (1995) and (by far the most 
interesting given the thrust of this paper) Dungey & Pitchford (1998). All of these 
models have serious short-comings in our view.  We briefly consider each in turn. 
 
In an Appendix to their paper on the relationship between employment output and 
unit labour costs, Russell & Tease (1991) examine the relationship between total non-
farm full-time employment and both real non-farm GDP and the real cost of labour
2 
over the period 1969:3 – 1987:4.  The long-run elasticity
3 of employment with respect 
to output
4 is 0.75 while the long-run elasticity of employment with respect to the real 
wage is -0.37 (Russell & Tease, 1991, p 44).
5  
 
Phipps & Sheen (1995) examined total non-farm employment in relation to real non-
farm GDP and real average weekly earnings
6 over the period 1979:1 – 1993:3.  The 
elasticity of employment with respect to output is “estimated at just under 0.75” while 
the elasticity of employment with respect to the real wage “is about -0.7” (Phipps & 
                                                 
1 There have been a number of papers modelling aggregate hours worked (eg Debelle & Vickery 
(1998) and many papers associated with TRYM, eg Commonwealth Treasury (1996), Downes & 
Bernie (1999), Stacey & Downes (1995). While these papers are not unrelated to this study we do have 
as our central focus a single equation modelling the number of people employed, and which does not 
treat this as simply given by the number of aggregate hours worked divided by average hours worked.  
2 Measured as non-farm wages, salaries and supplements plus payroll and fringe benefit tax deflated by 
the IPD for non-farm GDP. 
3 The elasticities we report here for the Russell & Tease paper differ from those reported by Dungey & 
Pitchford (1998, p 222) who list the elasticities given in Russell & Tease (1991) for the case where unit 
labour costs are used as an explanatory variable. We report elasticities given in Russell & Tease for the 
case where the real cost per employee (not per unit of output) is used as an explanatory variable. 
4 Researchers often find elasticities of employment with respect to output which depart quite markedly 
from unity and yet do not remark upon this or worry that it might suggest mis-specification.  
5 The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 0.81, which is consistent with an error correction 
parameter of  -0.19, suggesting that adjustment is ‘slow’.   They report no evidence of structural 
change. 
6 Nominal earnings are compiled on a national accounts basis. (Average earnings on a national 
accounts basis are composed of non-farm wages, salaries and supplements - including irregular 
bonuses, worker’s compensation, superannuation and redundancy payments - per wage and salary 
earner. See Reserve Bank of Australia (1996).) Real earnings are obtained by using the IPD for non-
farm GDP as the deflator.   5
Sheen, 1995, p 95).  They estimate their model with all variables in first-differences 
and so do not provide a direct estimate of technological change.
7 
 
Lewis & MacDonald (2002) estimate an employment equation for the period 1959:3 – 
1998:3. They postulate that the number of employed non-farm wage and salary 
earners can be explained by real GDP (including farm production), real wages and a 
time trend.
8  The Johansen method shows that the assumption of weak exogeneity is 
accepted for real wages and GDP. Their estimated employment equation yields long 
run coefficients (reported on page 24 of their paper, RH column) which indicate that 
the elasticity of employment with respect to real GDP is 1.05 and the elasticity of 
employment with respect to the real wage is -0.46.  The estimated coefficient on the 
time trend in their equation implies (as corrected by Dowrick and Wells, 2003) that 
technological change is proceeding at a rate of 2.2% per annum). Lewis & 
MacDonald conduct various tests for stability and find that “the long run relationship 
obtained [in the employment equation] is indeed stable” and that “for the employment 
equation there is a robust and stable set of parameter estimates” (Lewis & 
MacDonald, 2002, p 27).  
 
As noted above, Lewis & MacDonald (2002) have as their sample period 1959:3 – 
1998:3, which encompasses a period in the late 70’s and early 80’s in which there 
were quite marked reductions in standard hours of work (defined as ‘the number of 
ordinary hours specified by an award or an agreement beyond which overtime or 
penalty rates become payable’) across much of the economy. An interesting question 
then is whether Lewis & MacDonald were right to omit reference to hours and 
especially standard hours in their employment equation and also, given the purpose of 
their study, whether omitting standard hours has resulted in their obtaining a biased 
estimate of the elasticity of employment with respect to the real wage.
9  We return to 
these important questions in the empirical section of this paper. 
                                                 
7 Except for saying they choose their starting point to avoid complications related to the oil price 
shocks of 73/4 and 78/9 (1995, p 92 and p 102, n12), they do not discuss structural change or the 
stability of their equation.   
8 Real wages in their study are measured as the weekly wage of non-farm employees deflated by the 
GDP deflator.  
9 Not including average hours worked or standard hours would not be a major problem if they were 
constant. It would also not be an issue if our primary interest was in (say) the elasticity of employment  
with respect to the real wage (the elasticity of substitution), and also if hours were totally uncorrelated 
with the real wage. However, given that the three papers summarised above include in their sample   6
 
None of the studies reported above included any measure of actual hours worked or 
standard hours worked in their equations for employment. Effectively they are 
imposing a coefficient of zero on average hours in the employment equation. At the 
other extreme is the employment equation which is implicit in TRYM 
(Commonwealth Treasury (1996), Downes & Bernie (1999), Stacey & Downes 
(1995)) where a long-run coefficient of minus one on actual hours worked is imposed 
on the employment equation.
10 The only recent study of the employment equation for 
Australia which not only explicitly includes (average) hours but also allows the 
elasticity of employment with respect to hours to be estimated is by Dungey and 
Pitchford (1998, p 219-22 and p 233). They estimate an equation with total non-farm 
employment as the dependent variable with total average weekly hours, real aggregate 
GDP
11 (including farm production), real wages
12 and a time trend as explanatory 
variables. Their sample period is 1984:4 – 1997:1. The long run coefficients suggest 
that the elasticity of (total non-farm) employment with respect to GDP is 1.30 and the 
elasticity of employment with respect to the real wage is -0.40.
13  The real wage 
                                                                                                                                            
period the 70’s and early 80’s when standard (and actual) hours of work were falling markedly, the 
models are quite likely omitting a relevant variable and, to the extent that this omitted variable is 
correlated with the real wage, we would expect their estimate of the elasticity of substitution to be 
biased. It is possible to speculate a little on the direction of the bias. Standard hours fell quite markedly 
during the 70s and much of the fall was occurring at the same time as real wages were rising very fast. 
It is likely then, that if falling standard hours are included along with these other variables, that the 
elasticity of employment with respect to the real wage will be lower (nearer to zero) than if the 
employment equation were estimated without standard hours being included. 
10 Strictly speaking the TRYM labour demand equation is best viewed as an equation for labour 
services (the product of the number of persons employed and average hours worked). Debelle and 
Vickery (1998) also work with a labour services equation (ie the dependent variable is aggregate hours 
worked) but when they come to model unemployment they assume that average hours are constant 
(Debelle and Vickery, 1998, p 254). 
11 While it is odd that the measure of employment refers to the non-farm sector while the measure of 
aggregate production includes the farm sector, it is the case that, over their sample period (1984:4 – 
1997:1), the level of real (total) GDP and the level of real non-farm GDP are very highly correlated (r = 
0.999).  
12 Measured as average weekly earnings calculated on a national accounts basis deflated by the IPD for 
private consumption expenditure. The use of a deflator involving consumption expenditure prices is 
appropriate for a supply of labour equation but not for a demand for labour equation.  However over 
the data period they use 1984:4 – 1997:1 the price index for private consumption expenditure and the 
price index for non-farm GDP are very highly correlated (r = 0.996). 
13 The error-correction parameter is estimated to be –0.306 suggesting that the bulk of any adjustment 
takes place within one year of the shock. Short run dynamics included in the estimated equation 
suggest that an increase in the real wage results in a decrease in employment in the short run (as well as 
the long-run) and an increase in GDP results in an increase in employment in the short run (as well as 
the long-run). They report that estimation “over a longer time period suggests similar wage elasticities, 
and the standard Chow tests do not indicate breaks in the relationship. However, recursive estimations 
indicate that the regressions had difficulty fitting the data in the early 1980’s” (Dungey & Pitchford, 
1998, p 221).   7
elasticity is lower than that given by Lewis & MacDonald (-0.46) but this is to be 
expected, even allowing for differences in their sample periods. This is because the 
dependent variable in the Lewis & MacDonald equation is the number of (non-farm) 
Wage and Salary earners not (non-farm) Total Employment. Since some of the 
adjustment of labour services to a change in the real cost of labour would involve 
substitution of unpaid family workers for wage and salary employees and given also 
that a fall in the demand for wage and salary earners might lead not only to an 
increase in unemployment but also to an increase in the number of self-employed, we 
would expect the elasticity of total employment
14 with respect to labour costs to be 
lower than the elasticity of the number of wage and salary earners with respect to 
labour costs.  
 
The results reported by Dungey and Pitchford (1998) show that there is no long-run 
(or short-run) relationship between employment and average hours but, for some 
reason, they do not discuss this in their paper.
15 This is odd, given that in the text of 
their paper they explain very clearly why they think average hours worked should be 
included in the employment equation.  They say for example that “the use of 
employed persons, rather than hours, raises the question of potential substitution 
between employees and working hours. Firms may choose to pay more for extra hours 
from existing employees rather than hire more bodies (Hamermesh 1993), and they 
may choose to hire extra persons on a part-time basis. The Australian labour market 
has changed over the past two decades, in particular it has become increasingly 
flexible. One consequence is that additional persons employed may not accurately 
reflect changes in the hours of labour demanded. In an attempt to account for the 
changing hours of work, we augment the traditional labour demand equation with an 
hours-worked variable”  (Dungey & Pitchford, 1998, p 220f). 
 
In the models we have looked at in this section we have seen some that make no 
mention of hours (effectively imposing a long run (and short run) coefficient of zero 
                                                 
14 In addition to the number of wage and salary earners, total employment includes the number of 
unpaid family workers and self-employed along with the number of employers. 
15 The coefficient of the change in employment on the level of (actual) hours in their employment 
equation is –0.015 with an estimated standard error of 0.098 (Dungey and Pitchford, 1998, p 221). 
However, their sample period is 1984:4 – 1997:1 and it would appear that there was little change in 
standard and actual hours of work over the period and so, as we shall explain in the next section of this 
paper, this result is consistent with our theory of the employment – hours relationship.    8
on hours in the employment equation). We have seen one which allows hours to have 
a role in the long run relationship but which (perhaps surprisingly) finds a coefficient 
of zero (Dungey & Pitchford) and another model (to be found in various TYRM 
papers) which imposes a long-run trade-off between employment and (average) hours 
of minus unity. For reasons set out in the next section of the paper we find none of 
these approaches very satisfying. In the next section of the paper we enquire into the 
long-run relationship which theory suggests we might expect to find between 
employment and average hours worked and especially ‘standard’ hours of 
employment. However, before we do that, it may be of interest to have a quick look at 
historical data on the relationship between average hours worked per week and the 
number employed. It makes no great difference which employment and hours series 
we work with, they all convey the same general impression. Figure 1 shows the 
historical relationship between ‘Total civilian employment’  (in ‘000s) and the index 
of actual hours worked per week per employee over the period 1965:3 – 2001:3.
16 The 
rather dramatic leftward shift in the curve takes place over the period 1974:2-1982:3, 
a period when there were (successful) union campaigns for the extension of 4 weeks 
annual leave to all employees and then for a reduction in ‘standard hours’ of work in 
Australia from 40 to 38 (and in some industries to 35).  In case the reader might be 
concerned that a different data set might yield a different understanding of the 
historical relationship between the two variables we show in Figure 2 the relationship 
between the ‘Number of non-farm wage and salary earners’ (in ‘000s) and the index 
of actual hours worked per week per wage and salary earner over the period 1965:3 – 
2001:3.
17 The sample period in the Dungey and Pitchford (1998) paper includes only 
the left-most vertical segment of this figure where, except for very short-lived 
disturbances, the curve relating employees and hours is vertical – and so it is not 
                                                 
16 These series and all others used in this paper unless otherwise stated are from the ABS Treasury 
Model(s) module of the DX database. All series used in this paper have been seasonally adjusted at 
source. The employment data in Figure 1 is the series VTEQ.AN_NET. The hours data is the series 
VTEQ.AI_NH.  Our sample, period begins at 1965:3 because that is the first date for which we have 
quarterly data on average hours. 
17 The employment data in Figure 2 is the series VNEQ.AN_NNW. The hours data is the series 
VNEQ.AN_NHW.  Both are from the NIF database in DX.  There is a major problem with the average 
hours series in the NIF database and that is that the marked leftwards shift in the NIF hours series for 
wage and salary earners ends in 1976 and that for all employees ends in 1979. This is very odd for two 
reasons. First, it was not until 1981 that the 38 hour week was incorporated into the Metal Industries 
award and it was 1982 before it entered the Building Trades award and it is strange that the NIF series, 
unlike TRYM series, does not seem to be picking this up.  Second, if we convert the original ABS 
monthly data on average weekly hours into annual averages it is quite clear that average hours continue 
to fall into the early 80’s, only ceasing their decline in 1982 (as is recorded in the TRYM average hours 
series but not the NIF series). We deal with this matter at greater length in a later section of the paper.   9
surprising then that they find that there is no long-run trade-off between employment 
and hours. 
 
 [FIGURES 1 & 2 NEAR HERE] 
 
Both figures are consistent with a number of hypotheses to be teased out of the model 
to be developed in the next section of the paper, specifically that: over some periods 
(periods when standard hours are constant) there is no long-run relationship (trade-
off) between hours and employment (the curve relating hours and employment is 
vertical); that the relationship between employment and hours alters dramatically 
when standard hours change, and; that in the short-run employment and actual hours 
are negatively related. In the section which follows we present a very simple 
neoclassical model of labour services, employment and hours while in section IV we 
turn to the estimation of a new aggregate employment equation for Australia. 
 
III  A Cost-minimizing Model of the Relationship Between the Number of Persons 
Employed and Average Hours 
 
In this section of the paper we examine the long run relationship between the number 
employed and both average hours worked and ‘standard hours’ (where standard hours 
of work are defined to be ‘the number of ordinary hours specified by an award or an 
agreement beyond which overtime or penalty rates become payable’). For ease of 
exposition we assume that output is demand determined, that there are no capacity 
constraints, that the capital stock is given. We will also neglect raw materials so as to 
concentrate solely on identifying those economic factors which influence the firm’s 
choice of hours and number of employees.   
 
Labour services and output  
Consider a firm which is taking output, (all) prices and its capital stock and 
technology as given, so that output (Q) is a function of labour services (L) alone, such 
that  
 
  QA L
α =           ( 1 )  
   10
Labour services depend on average hours worked (h) and number of employees (N) so 
that 
 
() , Lg N h =           ( 2 )  
 
The relationship between L, N and h can be thought of in ‘isoquant’ terms, with there 
being a map which shows combinations of N and h which yield the same level of 




1 in Figure 3). Assuming that the ‘marginal products’ 
() L N ∂∂  and () L h ∂∂ are everywhere positive and diminishing, the iso-labour 
services curves will be convex and have the usual isoquant form as in Figure 3.  (We 
shall see later that certain restrictions may have to be placed on the labour services 
function as both the ‘isoquant’ and the relevant budget line turn out to be convex.) 
 
 [FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE] 
 
The approach we will follow sees the firm as taking output (Q) and thus the desired 
level of labour services as given and choosing cost-minimizing combinations of N and 
h to provide that level of labour services.
18  The nature of the ‘budget-line’ or ‘iso-
cost-line’ for labour services however will depend very much upon the model of the 
costs of labour services we propose.  In what follows we neglect fixed costs of hiring 
or firing as their introduction is unnecessary to make the point we wish to make, that 
in the presence of a kink in the budget line due to the imposition of a fixed level of 
standard hours (and overtime payments) the long run coefficient of N on h for a given 
level of standard hours, will be zero.  
 
The Cost of Labour and Standard Hours 
Imagine the cost of labour to the firm depends solely upon the wages paid to labour 
but that the payment which is made depends upon whether the hours worked are less 
than or equal to the number of standard hours (hs) or are overtime hours (h > hs).  
The ordinary time wage will be denoted by w and the ‘premium’ paid for overtime as 
ρ (ie the overtime wage is w (the normal time wage) plus ρ).
19 
 
                                                 
18 The approach taken here owes a lot to Rosen (1968), Hart (1984 & 1987) and Hamermesh (1993). 
19 Here and in the later empirical sections of the paper we take the ratio of ρ to w (and implicitly also 
the ratio of the fixed costs of employment to w) to be fixed .    11
Total labour cost will be  
 
  () Cw N h N hh s ρ =+ −         ( 3 )  
 
Under the conditions we have set out above  ( ) wh h hs ρ +−  will be the cost of an 
extra employee (or ‘packet’ of labour) to the firm.  The cost of an extra hour to the 
firm (given the number of employees) will be  ρ + w  if  h > hs and w if  hh s ≤ . 
 






wh h hs ρ
=
+−
         ( 4 )  
 
For a given budget (total cost, C) the rate at which the firm can trade the number 
employed for hours is given by the slope of the budget (ie the iso-cost) line which is 
the value of dN/dh with C constant.  
 
Consider first the case where no overtime is being worked.  If hh s ≤  then the term 






           (5) 
 








        ( 6 )  
 
The iso-cost line or budget line in {N:h} space will be convex because, if we 
differentiate (6) with respect to h, we find that  ( )
2 0 ∂ ∂= > dN dh h N h and so the 
slope of the iso-cost line (dN/dh) will become shallower (less negative), the larger is h 
(ie the smaller is N). Notice in passing that equation (6) is a rectangular hyperbola and 
so we should not use L = hN as our specification for labour services (ie as the specific 
form for equation (2)) because, if we did there would not be any unique values of N 
and h associated with cost minimisation (for the simple reason that the slope of the   12
budget line and the iso-labour services line would be the identical,
20 regardless of the 
values of N and h).  For there to be a determinate and sensible result the budget line 
must be less convex than the iso-labour services line.
21   
 
We turn now to determine the slope of the budget line when actual hours worked 
exceeds the number of standard hours (ie when overtime is being worked). It would 
seem that this is empirically the most likely scenario as ABS overtime data
22 shown in 
Figure 4 below indicates that over the whole of the period 1979:3 – 1999:2 the weekly 
number of overtime hours worked per employee (that is hours of overtime averaged 
over all employees, not merely those employees working overtime) remained above 1 
hour per week even in the depths of the two recessions we experienced over this 
period. 
 
 [FIGURE 4 NEAR HERE] 
 
 If overtime is being worked and hh s >  (ie the term in (3) involving the overtime 










dh C h w hs
ρ
ρρ
                  (7) 
 
This segment of the iso-cost line will be convex because 
() () () ()
2
0 ∂∂ = − + > dN dh h N h w hs ρρ . 
 
Dividing both the numerator and denominator of (7) by (h) gives us an expression for 
the slope of the budget line when hh s >  which we can compare easily with the 
expression for the slope of the budget line when hh s ≤  (this is given in equation (6) 
above). 
 
                                                 
20 The slope of both lines would be –N/h. 
21 See Brechling (1965, p 190) for further discussion of this. The TRYM labour demand equation, that 
posed by Debelle & Vickery (1998) and the aggregate hours equation in Lewis & MacDonald (2002) 
all seem to us to potentially suffer from this problem. 
22 Source of data is the DX ABS Time series database Table 6354-4A.   13




=− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −+ ⎝⎠
dN N
dh h hs h w ρρ
       ( 8 )  
 
Since both hs/h and  () w ρ ρ +  are positive and less than 1, the value of the slope as 
given by (8) will be steeper (more negative) than will the slope as given by (6), for the 
same values of N and h. Indeed, since the number of overtime hours is often only a 
very small fraction of total hours (and thus hs is ‘large’ relative to total hours h) the 
slope in the case when overtime is being worked (equation (6)) will likely be ‘quite 
steep’ compared with the slope of the budget line where hours worked are less than or 
equal to standard hours (equation (6)). Importantly, this implies is that there will be a 
pronounced ‘kink’ in the budget or iso-cost line at the point where h = hs and this in 
turn is likely to have the result that firms will tend to choose combinations of N and h 
involving values of h that are close to ‘standard hours, since that is where the ‘kink’ 
occurs.
23  This is depicted in Figure 5 where the solid line indicates an iso-labour 
services line and the broken line an iso-cost or budget line.   
 
 [FIGURES 5 & 6 NEAR HERE] 
 
In the absence of a change in standard hours one would expect as scale (Q) and thus N 
varies over time for the expansion path to lie along the vertical straight line depicted 
in Figure 6.  This conclusion of ours is reinforced by the argument that “it makes 
sense that … the firm’s optimal hours be independent of scale. There is no evidence 
that weekly hours of full-time workers at General Motors differ substantially from 
hours of workers at the local street fabricator” (Hamermesh, 1993, p 50).
24 Indeed, we 
shall see that, as a stylised fact, it does seem appropriate to propose that, for given 
standard hours, the expansion path for employment is vertical and that hours are 
invariant to scale (Figures 1 and 2 above are also supportive of this hypothesis).   
 
                                                 
23 Other explanations for a vertical expansion path come to mind. For example, if the iso-labour-
services line were to turn upwards (perhaps because, contrary to our assumptions, dQ/dh could be 
negative and indeed become negative) near or just past the point where h = hs. This could also explain 
the choice of (average) hours close to or just above standard hours.  Carter & Maddock (1984) explore 
this matter in some detail. 
24 Hart (1984, p 68 and  1987, p 74) argues that “equilibrium hours are scale-independent”. Rosen 
(1968, p 516) simply assumed that the equilibrium value of (average) hours is independent of the level 
of labour services.   14
All of which is to say that unless actual hours are varying with a change in 
equilibrium or standard hours, actual hours should not appear (or should not appear 
with a non-zero coefficient) in the long-run component of an equation for 
employment.  If however standard hours are changing then it is desirable that this be 
incorporated into the long run component of the employment equation. 
 
Changes in standard hours 
If standard hours (alone) were to change, what can we say about the likely effect of 
this on employment (cet par)? 
 






whs w h hs w h hs ρ ρρ
==
++ − + −
     (4’) 
 











                     (9) 
 
which is to say that a lengthening of standard hours where the firm wishes to maintain 
the level of labour services constant will result in the firm hiring more employees (and 
reducing overtime).
25 This is because hiring more employees is now more attractive, 
at the margin, than increasing hours for existing employees.  One way to see this is to 
think of the cost of an extra employee as the cost of a ‘packet’ of labour services with 
the cost being  w + ρ(h – hs). If hs rises with h given, the cost of the ‘packet’ of 
labour services falls relative to the cost of an extra hour beyond hs because a larger 
proportion of an employee’s hours can now be purchased at a cheaper rate. The 
                                                 
25 An alternative approach would be to ask about the effect on the slope of the budget line (as depicted 
in our Figures) of a change in hs. Differentiating (7) with respect to hs (assuming, inter alia, that h is 
constant) yields:  ( ) ( ) ( ) 32 0 dN dh hs w N C ρρ ∂∂ = − + < . Which is to say that (cet par) an increase in (a 
lengthening of) standard hours results in the slope of the budget line becoming steeper (more negative) 
and, as a result, there will be a tendency for N to rise (and h to fall). This is the same prediction we 
arrived at in the text.  It should be noted that we are assuming throughout that the firm is in the region 
where overtime is being worked. If that is not the case the effect of a change in standard hours on 
employment will depend upon whether actual hours are equal to or below the new level of standard 
hours. Hamermesh (1993), Hart (1984 & 1987) and Hart & Wilson (1988, p 176) find that empirically 
dN/dh is greater than zero for firms working overtime.    15
reverse will be true for a fall in hs given h.  A fall in hs will (cet par) induce a fall in N 
(as the cost of a ‘packet’ of labour services has increased) and a rise in overtime.
26  
 
Can we say anything about the likely size of the (output and wage constant) elasticity 
of employment with respect to standard hours?  Multiplying both sides of (9) by hs/N 







dhs hs w h hs ρρ
=>
+−
                             (10) 
 
Since both terms in parentheses on the RHS of the denominator are greater than 1 the 
elasticity will not only be positive but also be less than 1.  
 
We may take this a little further. If we can assume that h/hs is approximately equal to 
1,
27 the elasticity of employment with respect to standard hours in equation (10) will 








Since (a small amount of) overtime is often paid at ‘time and a half’
28 we may say that 
the value of the elasticity of employment with respect to standard hours is not only 
going to lie in the interval between 0 and 1 but is likely to be in the order of ½.   
 
Aggregation over firms working different hours 
Thus far we have assumed that there is a single representative firm with (all) 
employees working overtime hours. In reality some firms will be working above 
standard hours, some working exactly standard hours and some will be working less 
                                                 
26 We have assumed scale is unaffected by the change in standard hours, but there is every reason to 
believe that, absent an equi-proportionate or more than equi-proportionate reduction in the nominal 
wage (or rise in productivity), as standard hours fall ‘scale effects’ will reinforce the ‘substitution 
effect’ and lead to a reduction in numbers employed. 
27 Data on the DX ABS Time series database Table 6354-4A indicates that over the period 1979:3 – 
1999:2 the mean number of overtime hours worked per employee (not merely those employees 
working overtime) was 1.24 hours per week. If standard hours were (say) 38 then the ratio of h to hs 
would be in the order of 1.03, ie close to 1.   
28 And so ρ  = ½ w.   16
than standard hours.
29 In a more general model where some firms are in an overtime 
regime and while others are not, a drop (say) in standard hours will cause some firms 
to lower employment (this is the case we examined above), some would not alter the 
number they employ (this would be the case for firms whose hours of work are low 
enough that they are below standard hours even after standard hours have fallen), 
while some might increase employment following a fall in standard hours (this would 
be the case for firms which always operated at standard hours whatever they 
happened to be and, when faced with the same demand for labour services but lower 
average hours per worker will raise employment to compensate for the fall in hours).
30 
So although modellers usually focus on the case we have looked at above (where 
overtime is being worked) and empirically we do observe that on average across 
employees overtime is being worked, we must accept that in the more general case, 
“in which some firms are in an overtime regime while others are not … the effect of a 
change in standard hours becomes ambiguous” (Hamermesh, 1993, p 53f). Thus, 
although we will maintain the hypotheses derived in the previous section that the 
elasticity of employment with respect to standard hours is positive but less than one, 
(we maintain this hypotheses because it is the case that overtime is worked on 
average), we do none-the-less accept that the effect of a change in standard hours on 
the number of persons employed in the economy as a whole is complex and 
essentially becomes an empirical issue.   
 
The relationship between employment and hours in the short-run 
It is reasonable to argue that in the short run firms respond to demand/output shocks 
by initially adjusting average hours worked relative to the number of persons they 
employ. This notion is given theoretical support by Walter Oi (1962) and Sherwin 
Rosen (1968) amongst others. For example, Rosen (1968, p 517) has argued that it is 
an implication of the presence of fixed costs of employment that, “it is a clear 
implication of the fixed cost hypothesis that marginal costs of changing employment 
relative to changing hours of work per man will be higher the shorter the period of 
change and the larger are specific investments” (Rosen, 1968, p 518).  Given this, if 
scale falls (cet par) we would expect to see a fall in hours relative to N at least initially 
                                                 
29 In addition within any one firm some employees may be working overtime hours while others are 
working standard or less than standard hours. 
30 Hart (1987, p 99f) has a neat discussion of the various cases as has Hamermesh (1993, p 53f).   17
then a fall in N and a recovery of the original h.  So the path to be followed in N, h 
space is rather reminiscent of the path we describe in inflation:unemployment rate 
space for a downwards shock: initially leftwards towards the trade-off curve then 
rightwards down the trade-off curve to where it intersects the vertical long-run curve. 
See Figure 7 for an example.  Imagine initially equilibrium was at point X in the 
diagram and that there is an unanticipated permanent decrease in demand for the 




0.  Initially the 
firm will cut h relative to N, (say) moving from point X towards Y. As adjustment 
continues the firm will move from point Y to Z, with the same standard hours being 
worked as before but with a lower number employed. 
 
 [FIGURE 7 NEAR HERE] 
 
Thus far in this section of the paper we have looked at employment determination 
from the point of view of the cost function. In the next sub-section we show what our 
approach implies from the point of view of the production function. 
 
Nested CES Production and Labour Services functions 
The view we have of the production and input demand relationship can be set out as 
follows.  Firms produce output (Q) with the aid of labour services (L) and capital 
goods (K) and a level of technology (A).  Labour services in turn are a function of the 
number of employees (N) and the number of hours worked per employee (h).  In 
symbols 
 
  Q   =   f ( K ,   L ,   A )          (11) 
  L   =     g ( N ,   h )          (12) 
 
In what follows we assume that the production function which relates output to labour 
services and capital goods is CES in form and that within this is nested a CES labour 




                                                 
31 On nested CES models see Dixon and Rimmer (2002, pp 161-9).   18
Assuming competitive behaviour and constant returns to scale, profit maximization 
implies that equation (11) yields the following expression for the percentage change 
in labour services
32    
 
  l = q – a –  σLK(pL  –   p )       (13) 
 
where     l is the percentage change in labour services  
 q  is the percentage change in real output 
  a is a trend term incorporating, inter alia, the rate of technological change 
  p is the percentage change in the price of real output 
  pL is the percentage change in the price of one ‘bundle’ of labour services 
  σLK is the elasticity of substitution between labour services and capital 
 
Equation (13) says, as we would expect, that the rate of growth in the demand for 
labour services is related to the rate of growth in real output (with an elasticity of 1), 
the rate of technological change
33 and the rate of growth in the real price of labour 
services (pL – p), with an elasticity of substitution between labour services and capital 
(σLK).  Notice in passing that, since the output price (p) will be a weighted sum of the 
prices of the two inputs, (pL – p) will be equal to, greater than or less than zero 
depending upon the relative rates of change of the price of labour services and the 
user cost of capital. 
 
We turn now to labour services. Assuming labour services is related to N and h in a 
CES fashion, analogous reasoning to that used above yields the following expression 
for the percentage change in the number of employees  
 
  n = l – σNh(pN – pL)         (14) 
 
where     n is percentage change in the number of persons employed  
  pN is percentage change in the cost of an employee 
 p N  – pL  is percentage change in the cost of employees relative to the price 
of a bundle of labour services 
                                                 
32 In what follows all variable are expressed in percentage change form. 
33 In principle both (13) and (14) could have technological change terms in them.    19
  σNh is the elasticity of substitution between number of persons employed and 
hours of work per employee 
 
Substitution of  (13) into (14) gives 
 
  n = q – a – σLK(pL –  p) – σNh(pN  –  pL)      (15) 
 
which is to say that the percentage change in the number of persons employed 
depends upon the percentage change in real output (q), the rate of technological 
change (incorporated in a), the percentage change in the cost of an additional 
employee relative to the price of a ‘bundle’ of labour services (pN – pL), the percentage 
change in real cost of labour services (pL –p) and the size of two elasticities, the 
elasticity of substitution between labour services and capital goods (σLK) and the 
elasticity of substitution between the number of persons employed and hours of work 
per employee (σNh).    
 
Notice in passing that since the price of a bundle of labour services (pL) will be a 
weighted sum of the prices of the two inputs to labour services (persons and hours) 
and that (pN – pL) will be equal to, greater than or less than zero depending upon the 
relative rates of change of the cost of an additional employee and the cost of an 
additional hour of work.  Earlier in this section of the paper we saw that (if overtime 
is being worked) the cost of an additional hour of work is (w + ρ), where w is the 
ordinary time wage and ρ is the overtime premium, and that the cost of an additional 
employee
34 (given hours of work) is wh + ρ(h – hs), which can be written as (w + ρ)h 
– ρ hs.  An expression for the cost of an additional employee relative to the cost of an 











=− ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠
      ( 1 6 )  
 
                                                 
34 We are assuming here that there are no fixed costs of employment. If there are, a component 
representing the fixed costs per employee should be added on to the expression. 
35 Again, if there are fixed costs of employment an additional (constant) term is added on to the 
numerator of (16). If no overtime is being worked (16) reduces to h alone.    20
Equation (16) tells us that the relative price of an extra employee relative to an extra 
hour, and thus the size and sign of (pN – pL), will depend upon the level of standard 
hours (given actual hours) and the size of the overtime premium relative to the 
ordinary time wage rate. In effect, an increase in standard hours, given that overtime 
is being worked, is to reduce the cost of an additional employee relative to the cost of 
an additional hour. This is consistent with the result found earlier when we looked at 
the cost function.  Amongst other things, this indicates that an employment equation 
which includes only the first three items on the RHS of (15), is likely to be mis-
specified and will result in a biased estimate of σLK if (pN – pL)  is both varying over 
time and is correlated with (pL –p).  It is because we believe this might be the case 
that we have a number of times in the text suggested that estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution of labour for capital arrived at by fitting an employment equation which 
includes only the first three terms on the RHS of (15) to data which includes the 70s 
and early 80’s (when standard hours were changing) are likely to have yielded biased 
estimates of that elasticity.  Further, equation (16) provides additional motivation for 
our estimating equation which includes not only the first three terms on the RHS of 
(5) but, in addition, also allows for changes in standard hours as a proxy for the last 
term on the RHS of (5).
36 
 
In this section of the paper we have set out a highly stylised model of employment 
and hours. In the section which follows we estimate an employment equation for 
Australia over the period 1966:3 – 2001:3.  We begin by setting out specific 




Given the survey of empirical work set out in Section II and the thrust of the model 
set out in the previous section, it is possible to set out a list of quite specific issues and 
hypotheses to be explored empirically. These are: 
 
                                                 
36 It also provides an additional explanation for the link between the relative size of the overtime 
premium and the elasticity of employment with respect to standard hours.   21
1.  That standard hours should be included in the employment equation but if they 
are not changing there will be no association between the number employed 
and hours (actual or standard) in the long-run.
37 
2.  If standard hours are changing, we would expect, cet. par., that in the long run 
this will result in a change on the number employed. Given that the majority 
of firms are in the overtime regime
38 we predict that the number employed 
will change in the same direction as standard hours with an elasticity which is 
positive but less than unity and likely around ½ or less. 
3.  In the short run, employment and (actual) hours will be negatively related.   
4.  If hours are relevant to the employment equation but are not included (or are 
included but with an imposed parameter value that is incorrect) then it may be 
that estimates of the other parameters in the employment equation (such as the 
elasticity of employment with respect to the real wage – that is the elasticity of 
substitution (σ) – will be biased.   
 
All in all, these seem to be strong and clearly specified hypotheses which flow from 
our model and are capable of refutation.  
 
Stylised Model 
In developing an estimable model for the (derived) demand for employment, several 
options might be followed. One way to look at what we are doing is to see that our 
primary purpose is to consider the role of standard hours in the employment equation 
and, to that end, guided by economic theory as well as past empirical work, we 
include the real wage, output and a time trend as control variables.  Alternatively our 
estimating equation can be seen as the reduced form of a more elaborate model of 
hiring.  A formal model of a representative firm’s optimisation problem would 
involve maximisation of profits subject to explicit functional forms for the production 
function subject to a budget constraint with exogeneity assumed in wages, the 
overtime premium, standard hours, capital assets and product price (or explicit input 
                                                 
37 Since standard hours were relatively stable during the sample period examined by Dungey & 
Pitchford (1998), we see their result that employment and hours are unrelated in the long run as being 
consistent with our hypothesis. 
38 If firms are not in the region where overtime is being worked the effect of a change in standard hours 
on employment will depend upon whether actual hours are equal to or below the new level of standard 
hours. (See the closing parts of section III for more discussion of this.)   22
supply and output demand functions). Instead we will use a reduced form expression 
for long run or desired employment (N), as a function of the real wage, real output, 
standard hours of work and a time trend to capture the effects of technological change 
and other (trended) omitted variables. We are implicitly assuming a constant overtime 
premium relative to the normal time wage (and that any fixed costs of employment 
relative to the variable costs of employment are also constant) – to assume otherwise 
would mean that the hours-number of persons relationship will change in the long run. 
We make these assumptions due to the absence of adequate time series data on these 
items.  Leaving issues related to the dynamics of the relationship to one side, our 
estimating equation then will have the logarithm of employment on the LHS and the 




Figure 8 below sets out data for (the logarithms of) real non-farm GDP at market 
prices (this is series VNEQ.AVCH_GTM in the NIF database in DX), the number of 
non-farm wage and salary earners employed (this is series VNEQ.AN_NNW in the 
NIF database in DX) and the real wage. The real wage is measured as the average 
earnings of non-farm wage and salary earners (national accounts basis
39 - this is series 
NNEQ.AC_WARS$  in the NIF database in DX) adjusted for Payroll Tax
40 deflated 
by the price index for gross non-farm product at market prices (this is series 
VNEQ.AICH_PGNM  in the NIF database in DX).  We look at the employment of 
wage and salary earners for two reasons. First, that was the dependent variable in the 
most recent published study for Australia by Lewis and MacDonald (2002) and we 
are keen to facilitate comparisons between our study and that one. Secondly, given the 
nature of our theoretical model, it is the employment of wage and salary earners rather 
                                                 
39 This means that this series includes wages, salaries, and supplements such as worker’s compensation, 
superannuation  
40 Payroll tax has not been levied at a constant rate over the period. In particular there were marked 
increases in the early and mid 70s. The adjustment for payroll tax has been made by taking figures for 
total payroll tax paid per quarter from the NIF database (series VNEQ.AC_TPR$) dividing this by the 
number of non-farm civilian wage and salary earners, converting the result to a figure in dollars per 
employee per week and adding that on to the figure for average earnings of non-farm wage and salary 
earners on a national accounts basis. The payroll tax adjusted wage series diverges ‘slightly’ from the 
average earnings series in the early and mid seventies but apart from that the two are very highly 
correlated (r = 0.999 for the whole of the period).   23
than all persons employed (which would include unpaid family workers, self-
employed and employers), which seems to us to be the most relevant.
41   
 
 [FIGURE 8 NEAR HERE] 
 
As our quarterly series for average hours we use the TRYM measure for actual 
weekly hours worked (this is series VTEQ.AI_NH in the TRYM database in DX).  An 
advantage of the TRYM series is that it adjusts the ‘raw’ ABS data (which is 
extremely noisy) for average hours worked “to account for outliers that appear to be 
due to show day holidays affecting the hours worked data in particular months 
(identified via a detailed check of the Labour Force Survey disaggregated hours 
worked data). The effect of this adjustment is to remove a number of large spikes in 
the data which might otherwise lead to negative auto-correlation in the dynamics” 
(Downes and Bernie, 1999, p 53). In our judgment the TRYM series is a far more 
faithful quarterly version of the raw hours data then is the NIF hours series.  The 
actual hours worked series from TRYM (in index number form) is given as the solid 
line in Figure 9. We see there that actual hours worked per week fell markedly over 




We turn now to the quarterly series for standard hours. Unlike many European 
countries, in Australia there is no legislation or statute setting a limit on hours of 
work. However both awards and determinations have in the past had much to say 
about ‘standard’ or ‘ordinary’ hours of work. For example: the 40 hours week was 
introduced into awards in 1947/48 (prior to that period it had been 44);
43 over 1973/74 
four weeks annual leave was extended to virtually all employees; in 1981 the 38 hour 
week was incorporated into the Metal Industries award and in 1982 it entered the 
                                                 
41 At the beginning of our sample period wage and salary earners made up around 88½ % of all 
employed while at the end of our sample period it was around 87½ %. 
42 Actual average hours worked have been stable in part because the rise in the proportion of those 
employed who are working part-time (and which would have been pulling average hours worked by all 
employees down) has been accompanied by a (marked and sustained) rise in the average hours worked 
by full-time employees. Graph 3 in Lester (1999) suggests that average hours worked by full-time 
workers was constant over the period 1993-1999. 
43 In the 1952/3 Basic Wage and Standard Hours enquiry private employers sought to have standard 
hours returned to 44 hours per week. In 1961 private employers sought to have standard hours raised to 
42 hours per week.  (Both applications were refused.)   24
Building Trades award.
44  This (38 hours) “gradually became the standard throughout 
many industries over the course of the 1980’s, though a 35 hour week does exist in a 
number of industries including coal mining, oil and stevedoring, and Commonwealth 
public servants have worked a 36.75 hour week since 1902” (Wooden et al, 1994, p 
4). We have defined standard hours above as ‘the number of ordinary hours specified 
by an award or an agreement beyond which overtime or penalty rates become 
payable’. However, what ‘standard hours’ amount to in practice depends not only 
upon agreed ‘ordinary’ working hours but also upon leave entitlements, the number of 
public holidays and whether those public holidays fall on a weekend or not. A number 
of writers have attempted to develop a series for standard hours with and without 
adjustments for leave entitlements and/or leave taken,
45 the most recent being given in 
Wooden et al (1994). Fortunately there seems to be a good deal of agreement on the 
timing and the direction of movements in standard hours, at least until the (partial) 
deregulation of the labour market in the 1990s. We begin with a description of the 
main trends in standard hours for the period from 1965 up to the middle of the 1990s. 
Standard hours were roughly constant or falling slightly over the period 1965 – 1972, 
there was then a relatively steep fall between 1972 and 1978, a slight pause and then 
further falls until 1984 or 1985 after which it has been relatively stable. (We shall 
have more to say about hours since the mid 90s below.) The reader will notice that 
this account is very similar to a description one might give of the behaviour of 
average hours actually worked over the period (see for example the series given by 
the solid line in Figure 9) and indeed many authors have remarked on the fact that the 
‘trend’ in actual hours has tended to mimic the movement of standard hours,
46 as the 
theory set out in the previous section would predict. Indeed this gives rise to the 
notion that standard hours are an ‘attractor’ for actual hours and that a series for 
standard hours can be arrived at by fitting a trend (eg a logistic trend as in TRYM) to 
the series for actual hours.  Equilibrium hours worked in TRYM are determined by a 
                                                 
44 One reason why we favour the TRYM series over the NIF series is that neither of the series provided 
by NIF shows signs of any marked and permanent decline in the early 80’s and yet we know that it was 
in this period that the 38 (and in some awards, the 35) hour standard work week was spreading across 
industries. 
45 These include Butlin (1977), Linacre (1980), Steinke (1983), Bureau of Industry Economics (1984), 
Carter & Maddock (1984) and Wooden et al (1994). Raw data for standard hours for a full-working 
week according to “awards, determinations or collective agreements” were published by the ABS in the 
Labour Report, Cat. No. 6.7 and more recently in Award Rates of Pay Indexes, Australia, Cat. No. 
6312.0.  
46 At least until, the mid-1980’s – see Dawkins & Simpson (1994, p 14) and Wooden et al (1994, p 5) 
for example.    25
logistic equation the form of which shows that equilibrium hours are falling from 
1971:3 until 1983:3 and are constant after that date.
47  This movement “reflects the 
sharp movement down in the mid-1970’s due to the move to 35 hours as the standard 
work week” (Downes and Bernie, 1999, p 45).  The broken line in Figure 9 sets out 
the TRYM index of ‘equilibrium hours’ (this is series VTEQ.AI_NHLR in the TRYM 
database in DX) over the period 1965:3 – 2003:1. The TRYM series has two 
advantages when used as a series for ‘standard hours’:  First, its profile is consistent 
with other evidence on standard hours and the outline of the main influences given 
above. Second, it has the additional advantage that it is the trend in, and thus an 
‘attractor’ for, the actual hours of work series. 
 
 [FIGURE 9 NEAR HERE] 
 
The TRYM equilibrium hours series we are using as a proxy for standard hours has 
been constant throughout the 90’s.  There are reasons to view the notion that standard 
hours have been constant through the latter part of that period, in particular, with 
some caution. Indeed, it could be argued that, at least since the mid 90’s the very 
notion of ‘standard hours’ as a summary device is open to question at least since 
November 1996, when the Workplace Relations Act 1996 came into force.
48 Our 
position is as follows: At least up until the mid-1990s we think it unobjectionable that 
the stylised model of employment presented in the previous section of the paper is 
appropriate. Further, we think a case can be made for us to hold, at least as a 
hypothesis capable of refutation, that the stylised model can be applied (ie standard 
hours have persisted at an average level of 38 or so) beyond 1996,
49 and we provide 
the following arguments in support of this hypothesis. First, at least one employer 
body sees it that way. The chief executive of the Australian Chamber of Commerce 
                                                 
47 The logistic curve is centered on (ie has its point of inflexion at) 1976:3. It involves fitting the 
equation  hs = hsT + (∆hs/(1 + EXP(b(t – t*)))), where hs is standard hours (= ordinary time hours) at 
any date, hsT is standard hours (= ordinary time hours) at the end of the sample period (∆hs is hsT  - hs0  
and so hsT  + ∆hs = hs0) and t is an annual time trend with a value of 1 in 1965.  If t = t*  then  hs = hsT 
+ ½(∆hs).  As t tends to + infinity hs tends to hsT while as t tends to – infinity hs tends to hsT + ∆hs. 
48 A good summary of the history of deregulation can be found in Briggs & Buchanan (2000).  We 
refer to 1996 as the (possible) watershed on the basis of Wooden’s assertion that: “Enterprise 
agreement-making … only became widespread after the introduction of the Industrial Relations 
Reform Act 1993 (which came into force in March 1994). Further, many of the other regulatory reforms 
often highlighted as exacerbating trends towards longer working time … only assumed any 
significance after the introduction of the Workplace relations Act 1996 (Wooden, 2003, p 260). 
49 Or beyond the introduction of the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, which came into force in 
1994.   26
and Industry is reported as saying as recently as 2002 that:  “Most industrial awards 
continue to prescribe not only the maximum number of ordinary hours per week (38 
in many private sector awards), but still specify patterns of work; times of breaks; and 
rostering arrangements. The process of award simplification – whereby the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission itself had to wind back excessive award regulation 
to specified minima only – has only made a marginal difference.  Working hours 
continue to be over-regulated at a central level.” Hendy (2002, p 3).  Second, it would 
appear that 38 hours (the ‘old’ award level of standard hours in most private sector 
industries) has been carried over as the typical benchmark in agreements. The 
Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training (ACIRRT) 
Agreements Database and Monitor (ADAM), has information on 9,198 registered 
enterprise (collective) agreements from the Federal and State jurisdictions. The 
ADAM Database also holds information on federal Australian Workplace 
Agreements.  We are advised by the ADAM Database Coordinator (Nicola Parsonage  
- pers. communication) that “the range for ordinary time is somewhere between 35 
and 45 hours per week but it is reasonable to say that 38 hours is the standard and 
that, in general terms, any hours in addition to this would be seen as overtime hours”. 
Buchanan et al (2001, p 43) in their survey of working time arrangements in 
enterprise agreements current in 2001 (the last year in our sample period) report that  
“a “majority [of agreements] state that ordinary hours are 38 per week [as] many 
provisions simply mirror what’s in the Award”.  Third, we have earlier argued that 
standard hours are an attractor for actual hours and so it is reasonable to take into 
account other information on actual (ordinary time) hours over the past decade. Since 
1974 the ABS has conducted a survey of employers which collects (inter alia) 
information on the number of hours worked each week which are paid for at the 
ordinary rate (hence their description of these hours as ‘ordinary time’).
50  The data of 
most relevance to our study is that for the ordinary time hours of adult non-
managerial employees who are employed full-time (our emphasis).  The term non-
managerial indicates that the data “excludes managerial, executive, professional and 
higher supervisory staff”. Ordinary time hours paid for are defined as: “Award, 
standard or agreed hours of work, paid for at the ordinary time rate.”  Notice that the 
information is not restricted to employees covered by awards.  Unfortunately although 
                                                 
50 These estimates are to be found in ABS 6306.0 - Employee Earnings and Hours, Australia.     27
it was conducted annually until 1998 the most recent surveys are for 2000 and 2002 
but the main features of this data are consistent with our ‘as if’ hypothesis.  According 
to the survey data, ordinary time weekly hours (this is a weighted sum of the data for 
males and females – although for full-time employees there is relatively little 
difference between ordinary time hours for males and females in most years) were 
38.5 in 1974, falling to 38.4 by 1977 and then to 38.3 in 1980, 38.1 in 1983 and to 
37.8 in 1984.  It dipped to 37.7 in 1989 and 1990 and then rose to 37.9 in 1992 where 
it remained until 1998 when it rose again to 38.0. In  2000 it was 38.0 and, in 2002, 
37.9.  So after a fall in the early 80’s, it would appear that ordinary time hours for 
adult non-managerial employees have been fairly stable at around 38 hours.
51   To 
summarise our thoughts on standard hours since the mid-nineties: doubtless ‘non-
standard’ employment has been growing in recent years however, in the search for a 
parsimonious model capturing the essential features in a single employment equation, 
whether this is seen as useful in its own right or merely as the first step to a more 
sophisticated analysis, we believe it is appropriate to maintain the ‘standard hours’ 
notion, whether as a ‘stylised fact’ or as an ‘as if’ hypothesis, beyond the mid 90’s.
52   
 
Our Findings   
All of the series we are interested in are I(1) over our sample period.
53  Set out below 
are the results of using EViews to estimate an error correction model with the change 
in the logarithm of employment (LN) as the dependent variable and with a time trend 
(TREND - to pick up technological change) and the logarithms of the real wage 
(LRW), production (LY), standard hours (LHS) and actual hours (LHA) as explanatory 
variables.
54 Standard hours enter into the long run portion of the equation while actual 
                                                 
51 The information given here is consistent with rising actual hours on the part of full time employees 
for two reasons. First, we are talking about ‘ordinary time hours’ not actual hours. Second, it appears to 
be the case that  while those “working extended hours includes employees from all major occupational 
groups [the] highest proportions [are] managers and administrators, professionals and associate 
professionals” (Campbell, 2002, p 96).  The 2001 Census also shows that “Very long working hours 
are more common among workers who are self-employed [and employers] than among employees” 
(ABS, Social Trends, Cat. No. 4102.0, 2003, p 120). It also appears that there has been considerable 
growth in ‘unpaid’ overtime (Heiler (1998) and Campbell (2002)). 
52 Another way to put it would be to say that we are proceeding under the assumption that firms have 
behaved post 1996 “as if” standard employment were the rule. (For a defence of the “as if” approach – 
which is not without its critics - see Friedman (1953)). 
53 This should be obvious from looking at the various charts we have provided. Formal unit root tests 
confirm this visual impression.   
54 A VECM was first estimated for the variable set (LN, LY, LRW, LHS, TREND). The LR test that 
LRY, LRW and LHS are exogenous was not rejected at the 5% level of significance.   28
hours only enter into the short run dynamics. The employment equation for the 
sample period
55 1966:3 – 2001:3 is
56  
 
     C o e f f i c i e n t     Std error   p-value 
Constant     –0.2725    0.2078   0.1919 
Error Correction Parameter    –0.2534  0.0373   0.0000 
Long run components 
  LY          1.0715  0.1050   0.0000 
  LRW      –0.3414  0.0754   0.0000 
  LHS          0.4573  0.1413   0.0015 
  TREND     –0.0032  0.0008   0.0000 
Short run components 
  D(LY)        0.3007  0.0570   0.0000 
  D(LRW)     –0.0824  0.0406   0.0446 
  D(LHA)     –0.1843  0.0680   0.0008 
 
The implied long-run values of the coefficients (the long run elasticities) are as 
follows: the elasticity of employment with respect to non-farm GDP (which we take 
to be an estimate of the degree of returns to scale
57) is 1.07, the elasticity of 
employment with respect to the real wage
58 (which we take to be an estimate of the 
elasticity of substitution) is 0.34 and the elasticity of employment with respect to 
standard hours is 0.46.  The Long run coefficient on the time trend (–0.0032) yields an 
estimated annual rate of technological progress of 1.9% per annum.
59   
 
                                                 
55 The earliest period for which we have quarterly hours data in DX is 1965:3 however examination of 
the data showed marked instability in the first few observations. For that reason we have chosen to use 
1966:3 as the first period in our study.   
56 Both the Schwarz Criterion and the Hannan-Quinn Criterion support a zero lag order. Residual 
diagnostics show that the residuals are well behaved in that neither autocorrelation nor ARCH is 
present and there are no departures from normality. Essentially the same results are arrived at if we use 
as the real wage a measure which has not been adjusted for payroll tax. 
57 A worrying feature of many earlier studies of the employment equation is their finding that returns to 
scale are not constant.  Here, the hypothesis that the elasticity of employment with respect to output is 
1 is not rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
58 If we restrict our sample period to 1984:4 on (the start of the period looked at by Dungey & Pitchford 
(1998)), the estimate of the elasticity of substitution is 0.42 with a standard error of 0.10. 
59 As Ferguson (1965), Dowrick & Wells (2003) and others have shown the coefficient on the time 
trend in the employment equation is not itself an estimate of the rate of technological progress, it is 
instead equal to –(1 – σ)λ, where σ is the elasticity of substitution and λ is the rate of technological 
progress.  Our figure for the annual rate of technological progress is arrived at by dividing 0.0032 by 
0.66 (ie by 1 – 0.34) and multiplying the result by 4.   29
Of some importance is the significance, sign and size of the coefficient on standard 
hours.  The sign on this variable is consistent with our hypothesis that we can view 
the aggregate as if it were a single firm operating in the overtime region. The size is 
consistent with our hypothesis that the elasticity of employment with respect to 
standard hours (given that firms are operating in the overtime region) will be 
approximately equal to the overtime premium expressed as a proportion of the normal 
time wage. A Wald test decisively rejects the restriction that the coefficient on 
standard hours is zero.   
 
The error correction term suggests that a little over ¼ of any disequilibrium is 
corrected in any quarter.
60 The short run elements have sensible signs and we note 
that there is a negative relationship as we have hypothesised between actual hours and 
employment in the short run. In addition to the partial adjustment of employment in 
relation to any gap between actual and desired (long-run equilibrium) employment, 
the change in employment responds positively to a short-run change in output, but 
with an elasticity of 0.3, it responds negatively to the change in real wages with a low 
elasticity of –0.08, and it is slowed by any change in current hours. 
 
One other feature of our results is that our estimate of the elasticity of substitution is 
below that reported by Lewis & MacDonald (2002), consistent with our conjecture 
earlier that by neglecting standard hours their estimate of the substitution elasticity 
would be biased upwards. Indeed, if we estimate an employment equation for the 
same sample period (1966:3 – 2001:3) and variables as those we have reported above 
but without including standard hours (so the only variables in the long-run component 
of the model are those included by Lewis and MacDonald – ie output, real wages and 
a time trend) we find that the long-run elasticity of substitution is estimated to be 
0.476, well above what we find when standard hours are included. 
 
Figure 10 shows the cumulative effect upon employment of a 1% increase in non-
farm GDP (upper line) and a 1% increase in the real wage (lower line). 
                                                 
60 The significance of the error correction term (and also the fact that it has the correct sign and that it 
lies between 0 and 1) indicates that the variables are cointegrated. Since the set of long-run explanatory 
variables includes the deterministic term LHS, the error correction test for cointegration was based on 
the critical values given in Ericsson & MacKinnon (2002). The Johansen test was also applied and it 
confirmed the presence of only one cointegrating equation.   30
 
[FIGURE 10 NEAR HERE] 
 
We think it important, given the history of the Australian wages and (un) employment 
policy debates in recent decades, to consider possible asymmetric effects on 
employment of changes in output (and other variables which enter into the 
employment equation).  
 
Testing for asymmetries 
It is of interest to consider the possibility that employment might display some 
asymmetric response to changes in its determinants and, most especially, if the 
behaviour of employment in periods of downturn when the economy is moving into 
recession is different to that in non-recession periods.
61 One reason why we expect 
this is that when the economy is in recession not only are there many firms which are 
forced to close business, but managers of firms which ‘survive’ are under 
considerable pressure to rationalise their business operations, and society, including 
labour unions, are less resistant to dismissals which are widespread and are perceived 
to be necessary for the firm to survive.  Our test for asymmetries involves introducing 
dummy variables which have a value of 1 if the period is a period of recession
62 and 0 
otherwise in such a way that the size of a coefficient in the regression equation might 
be higher or lower in a recession period than otherwise. We began by hypothesising 
that the asymmetries may affect the constant term, the error correction parameter and 
the short run coefficients on output, the real wage and hours. Wald tests showed that 
the only significant asymmetry was in relation to the error correction parameter.   The 
employment equation for the same sample period as that considered earlier (1966:3 – 
2001:3) and for the same dependent variable D(LN) as estimated earlier but now with 
a time varying error correction parameter is:
63 
                                                 
61 There are a number of reasons why one might be interested in this but a dominant motivation for us 
is the observation that unemployment has risen rapidly in recessions but declines only slowly during 
recoveries.  Evidence from gross flows data (see for example Debelle & Swann (1998) and Leeves 
(1997)) suggests that an important contributing factor (but by no means the only contributing factor) to 
this rapid rise in unemployment is the marked increase in flows from employment to unemployment in 
recession episodes.   
62 Following the latest estimates by Boehm & Summers (1999, Table 4), there are only two (classical) 
downturns in GDP over the time frame we are considering. Those two periods are 1982:1-1983:1 
inclusive and 1990:1-1991:1 inclusive.  
63 Again, the sample period is 1966:3 – 2001:3. Residual diagnostics show that the residuals are well 
behaved in that neither autocorrelation nor ARCH is present and there are no departures from 
normality.   31
 
 
     C o e f f i c i e n t     Std error   p-value 
Error Correction Parameter     –0.2277  0.0266   0.0000 
Adjustment to EC parameter  
if economy is in recession     –0.4408  0.0896   0.0000 
Long run components 
  LY            0.9846  0.0204   0.0000 
    LRW      –0.3655  0.0335   0.0000 
  LHS            0.4298  0.1313   0.0014 
    TREND     –0.0024  0.0002   0.0000 
Short run components 
  D(LY)          0.2702  0.0439   0.0000 
    D(LRW)     –0.0893  0.0416   0.0339 
    D(LHA)     –0.1798  0.0669   0.0081 
 
The results here, except for the time varying nature of the error correction parameter, 
are essentially the same as those arrived at earlier. The implied long-run values of the 
coefficients (the long run elasticities) are: for the elasticity of employment with 
respect to Production, 0.98 (in the model which made no allowance for asymmetry it 
was estimated to be 1.06), the elasticity of substitution, 0.37 (it was estimated to be 
0.34 in the model which made no allowance for asymmetry) and the elasticity of 
employment with respect to Standard hours, 0.43 (earlier, it was estimated to be 0.46).  
The long run coefficient on the time trend (–0.0024) yields an estimated annual rate of 
technological progress of 1.5% per annum. Comparing these figures with those 
presented earlier for the model without any allowance for asymmetry the only 
difference worth remarking on is the lower (and probably more acceptable) estimate 
for the rate of technological progress (1.5% here compared with 1.9% earlier).
64   
Again, the short run elements have sensible signs and we note that as we have 
hypothesised there is a negative relationship between actual hours and employment in 
the short run. 
 
                                                 
64 Our figure for the annual rate of technological progress is arrived at by dividing 0.0024 by 0.63 (ie 
by 1 – 0.37) and multiplying the result by 4.   32
Turning to our estimates for the error correction parameter, we have found that it is 
time varying in such a way that it is considerably higher (–0.669) when the economy 
is in recession than when it is not (if the economy is not in recession the error 
correction parameter is at its ‘base’ value of (–0.228). This is a substantial difference 
which is not only statistically significant but also, in our view, it is of considerable 
‘economic’ significance as it helps explain why it is that we see such marked 
asymmetries in the behaviour of the unemployment rate over the cycle.
65 
 
Figure 11 shows the cumulative effect upon employment of a 1% increase in non-
farm GDP (upper line) and a 1% decrease in non-farm GDP (lower line). The effects 
of the asymmetry and especially the rapid fall of employment in recession episodes is 
clearly evident. 
 
 [FIGURE 11 NEAR HERE] 
 
 
IV Concluding Remarks 
 
We have argued that it is important in explaining employment to allow for changes in 
‘standard hours of work’ and that, unless actual hours are varying with a change in 
equilibrium or standard hours, actual hours should not appear (or should not appear 
with a non-zero coefficient) in the long-run component of an equation for 
employment.  If however standard hours are changing, then it is desirable that this 
variable be incorporated into the long run component of the employment equation. 
We derive an expression for the elasticity of employment with respect to standard 
hours and show that it is related to the size of the premium for overtime.  We find 
empirical support for our approach and are able to provide new estimates of the 
elasticity of substitution, the scale parameter and the rate of technological change for 
Australia.  We also found marked asymmetry in the speed of the short-run response of 
employment to variations in real GDP and real wages in recession episodes as against 
non-recession periods. Our preferred estimates of the long run elasticity of 
                                                 
65 Of course asymmetries in the behaviour of participation rates may also play a role (see Dixon 
(1996)).   33
employment with respect to the real wage is –0.37. The error correction parameter is 
0.23 in non-recession and 0.65 in recession periods.  
 
Two caveats in particular should be mentioned. First, it is not clear how far into the 
future one would with to ‘push’ this model as increasingly the notion of standard 
hours as a benchmark between different levels of labour cost is diminishing. Overtime 
rates are increasingly being absorbed into normal time and thus the distinction 
between ordinary and overtime hours is featuring in fewer and fewer agreements. 
Also, time off (at ordinary rates) in lieu of overtime is also a feature of many 
agreements.  Second, we have not dealt explicitly with fixed costs of employment, 
such as training costs.  We have not done so because of data problems in relation to 
such costs, and especially data problems in obtaining information on how they have 
varied on a quarterly basis over time. However, a full understanding of employment 
can only be gained by distinguishing between part time, causal and full time 
employees, and that of necessity means incorporating fixed costs of employment into 
the model.  Our intention is to attempt to do this in the near future. 
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FIGURE 1 
Total civilian employment (000’s - vertical axis) and Index of Hours worked per 
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FIGURE 3 
Iso-labour services curves. Employment (N) is on the vertical axis and average hours 
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FIGURE 5 





The expansion path for employment (solid lines are iso-labour services lines while 
broken lines are iso-cost lines) 
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FIGURE 7 
The path of employment and hours following a downwards shock to scale (solid lines 
are iso-labour services lines while broken lines are iso-cost lines) 
   
 
FIGURE 8 
Logarithms of real non-farm GDP at market prices (middle line, LH scale), number of 
non-farm wage and salary earners employed (bottom line, also LH scale) and the real 
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FIGURE 9 
Indices of actual (broken line) and standard (solid line) hours of work, both from  the 
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FIGURE 11 
Cumulative Effect on Employment of a 1% increase in real non-farm GDP (top line) 
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